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1) A	coin’s	propensity	to	land	heads	with	a	certain	probability	when	tossed	as	displayed	in	a	long	sequence	of	tosses.		 2) Smoking’s	propensity	to	cause	lung	cancer	with	a	certain	probability,	as	demonstrated	by	control	population	statistics.		 3) The	propensity	of	a	radioactive	atom	to	decay	with	a	certain	probability	exhibited	in	experiments	run	on	the	material.			 There	are	obvious	differences	between	the	cases.	The	first	statement	describes	an	ordinary	or	everyday	chance;	the	second	one	involves	a	chance	to	cause	a	particular	effect;	and	the	final	statement	refers	to	a	putatively	fundamental	and	therefore	irreducible	chance	in	atomic	physics.	3	Nevertheless	all	these	statements	appears	to	involve	three	distinct	properties:	the	“propensities”	of	the	chancy	object;	the	“certain	probabilities”	that	such	propensities	give	rise	to;	and	the	(finite,	actual)	frequencies	of	the	corresponding	outcomes	observed	in	an	experimental	trial	which	display	such	probabilities.			 In	other	words,	the	“appearances”,	as	I	shall	call	them,	involve	three	distinct	properties.	Yet,	reductive	analyses	of	chance	(frequency	and	propensity	interpretations	of	probability)	aim	to	reduce	them	all	to	just	one,	or	at	best	two.	On	the	frequency	interpretation	propensities	are	redundant	and	can	be	discarded	altogether;	and	probabilities	can	be	fully	analysed	in	terms	of	either	long	run	actual	frequencies,	or	hypothetical	limiting	frequencies.	Carnap	refers	to	such	an	identification	of	probabilities	with	frequencies	as	the	“identity	conception”	(Carnap,	1945,	p.	527).	And	while	there	is	debate	amongst	different	frequency	schools,	in	particular	regarding	the	status	and	nature	of	the	limiting	hypothetical	frequencies,	they	are	all	agreed	on	the	essential	facts	about	reduction.	On	any	of																																																									3	One	may	in	turn	wonder	whether	all	bona	fide	chances	ultimately	reduce	to	physical	chances.	The	answer	turns	on	the	thorny	question	of	whether	the	“special”	sciences,	and	indeed	ordinary	cognition	of	macroscopic	objects	and	phenomena,	ultimately	reduce	to	physics.	I	very	much	doubt	such	reduction	is	possible	or	desirable,	but	my	claims	in	this	paper	are	independent	and	require	neither	reductionism	to	physical	chances,	nor	its	denial.		
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these	schools	there	are	only	really	frequencies;	every	reference	to	any	other	apparent	concept	in	the	statements	above	is	in	fact	redundant.				 On	the	other	hand	the	propensity	interpretation	of	probability	defended	by	Karl	Popper	(Popper,	1959)	notoriously	embraced	a	similar	(but	incompatible)	identification	of	probabilities	with	propensities,	which	I	have	elsewhere	referred	to	as	the	“identity	thesis”	(Suárez,	2013).	On	this	view,	there	are	of	course	finite	frequencies	in	actual	experimental	runs	of	any	experiment,	but	they	need	have	no	limiting	properties.	Probabilities	are	at	any	rate	not	to	be	identified	with	either	the	actual	or	the	hypothetical	limiting	frequencies.	They	are	instead	propensities.	So,	on	this	account	there	are	only	really	frequencies	and	propensities;	any	apparent	reference	in	the	statements	above	to	“probability”	as	a	distinct	kind	or	property	is	ultimately	redundant.			 Each	of	these	reductions	has	had	formidable	champions	throughout	the	history	of	the	subject;	in	fact	barely	any	philosopher	of	probability	has	failed	to	attempt	one	or	another	version	of	this	reduction	of	chance.	Yet,	there	are	by	now	very	strong	arguments	against	both	kinds	of	reduction,	which	suggest	that	the	prospects	of	a	reduction	of	probability	are	dim.		I	shall	here	only	review	arguments	to	the	effect	that	probability	cannot	be	reduced	to	propensity.	But	the	arguments	by	Alan	Hajek	and	others	against	frequency	interpretations	of	probability	are	at	least	as	convincing.	4	All	three	concepts	(propensity,	probability,	frequency)	seem	to	be	required	for	a	satisfactory	understanding	of	objective	chance.				 My	main	claim	in	this	essay	is	that	what	Carnap	called	probability2	is	not	in	fact	a	monolithic	notion.	It	too	is	plural,	and	composed	of	an	array	of	three	different	concepts	holding	interestingly	complex	relations	to	each	other.	In	addition	I	do	of	course	accept	subjective	probabilities	or	credences,	and	perhaps	also	distinct	logical	or	epistemological	probabilities	(confirmatory	probabilities).	In	other	words,	I	very	much	share	Carnap’s	pragmatic	pluralism,	but	whereas																																																									4	Some	of	Hájek’s	arguments	(1997)	rely	on	the	well-known	reference	class	problems.	I	am	not	so	interested	in	them	here	because	they	leave	open	any	claim	regarding	a	reduction	to	propensities,	and	I	am	arguing	for	a	full	tripartite	distinction.	
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Carnap	tried	to	minimize	the	pluralism	by	restricting	it	to	two	kinds	of	probability,	I	find	good	reasons	nowadays	to	want	to	maximize	the	pluralism	in	order	to	achieve	a	full	understanding	of	objective	chance.	There	are	both	negative	and	positive	reasons	for	maximal	pluralism.	The	negative	reasons	have	all	to	do	with	the	failures	of	reductive	programmes	(section	3).	The	positive	reasons	are	connected	with	the	presuppositions	of	scientific	practice	(section	4)			3.	Against	the	Identity	Thesis			 Let	me	briefly	review	the	argument	from	the	philosophy	of	probability	against	the	identity	thesis	between	propensities	and	probabilities.5	The	identity	thesis	has	two	parts,	or	halves,	which	we	may	refer	to	as	the	propensity-to-probability	half	and	the	probability-to-propensity	half.	The	former	asserts	that	all	propensities	are,	or	can	be	represented	as,	probabilities.	The	latter	states	that	all	probabilities	are	propensities,	or	can	be	interpreted	as	such.	Together	they	make	the	full	claim	that	probabilities	and	propensities	are	extensionally	identical.				 Both	parts	of	the	identity	thesis	are	in	fact	false,	as	is	shown	by	different	forms	of	what	is	known	as	Humphreys’	paradox.	The	falsity	of	the	probability-to-propensity	half	is	a	trivial	consequence	of	the	asymmetries	of	propensities.	This	is	best	understood	by	considering	a	causal	propensity	such	as	smoking’s	propensity	to	cause	lung	cancer	(my	example	2	above).	Suppose	we	estimate	for	a	particular	population	the	incidence	of	lung	cancer	amongst	smokers	at	1%,	which	we	may	write	as	P	(C	/S)=	0.01.	And	suppose	that	we	also	have	estimates	for	the	prior	probabilities	of	smoking	and	lung	cancer	across	the	population	at,	say,	20%	and	0,5%	respectively	(P	(S)=	0.2	and	P	(C)	=	0.005).	We	may	then	easily	estimate	the	inverse	probability	by	means	of	Bayes’	theorem:			 	
€ 
P S C( ) =
P C S( )P S( )
P C( ) =
0.01× 0.2
0.005 = 0.4 .																																																									5	The	full	argument	may	be	found	in	Suárez	(2013,	2014)	of	which	this	section	is	an	elaboration	and	summary.	
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Pt3 Tt 3 It 2 & Bt1( ) = p > 0 .	ii)	
€ 
1 > Pt1 It 2 Bt1( ) = q > 0 .	iii)	
€ 
Pt1 Tt 3 ¬It2 & Bt1( ) = 0 .			 Each	of	these	formal	conditions	is	meant	to	capture	fully	each	of	the	corresponding	physical	claims	regarding	the	propensities	at	work	in	the	thought	experiment.	This	assumes	that	there	is	always	a	unique	representation	for	propensities	in	terms	of	conditional	probabilities.	Yet,	these	three	formal	conditions	are	inconsistent	with	the	Kolmogorov	axioms,	and	in	particular	with	the	fourth	axiom	for	conditional	probability	(also	known	as	the	ratio	analysis	of	conditional	probability).			 Now,	there	are	a	number	of	caveats	to	Humphreys’	proof,	which	I	cannot	discuss	here	in	full,	but	deserve	a	brief	mention.		Firstly,	the	proof	assumes	a	principle	of	conditional	independence	whereby	propensities	do	not	act	backwards	in	time:	
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P B A( )






℘ S( ) 	defined	over	the	sample	space.	In	other	words	a	statistical	model	is	functionally	a	map:	
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℘θ i S( ) 	defined	over	the	sample	space.	As	McCullagh	(2002,	p.	1225)	notes:	“it	is	important	to	distinguish	between	the	model	as	a	function	
€ 
P :Θ→℘ S( ),	and	the	associated	set	of	distributions	
€ 
℘θ i S( )⊂℘ S( )”.				 A	statistical	model	comprises	both	the	parameter	set	and	the	set	of	probability	functions	over	the	sample	space.	So,	implicitly,	a	statistical	model	is	defined	over	two	distinct	domains:	Θ	and	S.		The	former	domain	appears	merely	as	a	subscript	to	the	probability	distribution	function.	It	is	the	latter	domain,	the	sample	or	outcome	space,	that	is	the	proper	sigma	field	over	which	the	probabilities	are	defined.	It	follows	then	that	the	probabilities	in	a	statistical	model	are	not	defined	over	the	parameter	set	that	represents	the	phenomenon	in	question.	The	relationship	between	the	sample	space	and	the	parameter	set	is	rather	indirect;	and	the	most	important	question	for	any	modeller	is	precisely	how	to	‘convert’	the	parameter	space	meaningfully	into	the	sample	or	outcome	space.	There	is	no	trivial	algorithmic	procedure:	It	is	rather	a	highly	contextual	matter	of	judgement,	relative	to	the	particular	problem	at	hand.	It	effectively	transforms	a	question	regarding	the	phenomenon	and	its	causes	into	a	question	regarding	the	probabilities	in	the	model.	The	model	must	of	course	be	consistent	with	known	data	relative	to	the	phenomenon,	but	it	is	hard	to	see	how	it	would	not	involve	idealization	of	one	sort	of	another.	This	is	after	all	one	more	instance	of	‘modelling’	
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the	phenomena	in	a	streamlined	description.	To	quote	from	the	distinguished	statistician	David	Cox	(2006,	p.	197):		 	 “Formalization	of	the	research	question	as	being	concerned	with	aspects	of	a	specified	kind	of	probability	model	is	clearly	of	critical	importance.	It	translates	a	subject-matter	question	into	a	formal	statistical	question	and	that	translation	must	be	reasonably	faithful	and,	as	far	as	feasible,	the	consistency	of	the	model	with	the	data	must	be	checked.	How	this	translation	from	subject-matter	problem	to	statistical	model	is	done	is	often	the	most	critical	part	of	an	analysis.	Furthermore,	all	formal	representations	of	the	process	of	analysis	and	its	justification	are	at	best	idealized	models	of	an	often	complex	chain	of	argument.”			 The	most	important	constraint	in	statistical	modelling	is	this:	The	derivation	of	the	sample	space	from	the	parameter	space	must	be	responsive	to	the	features	of	the	phenomenon.	The	function	that	takes	from	the	parameter	set	Θ	to	the	probability	distribution
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functions	in	the	statistical	model	that	accounts	for	the	phenomena	of	radioactive	decay.	13			 7. Conclusion			 I	have	argued	for	maximal	pluralism	about	chance,	by	providing	negative	and	positive	arguments	for	a	tripartite	distinction	between	propensities,	probabilities,	and	frequencies.	Humphreys’	paradox	provides	grounds	for	the	distinction,	since	it	makes	it	very	implausible	that	chances	may	be	reduced	or	analysed	away	in	any	fewer	terms.	In	addition,	I	have	positively	displayed	elements	in	the	practice	of	statistical	modelling	recommending	the	same	distinction.	Finally,	I	have	argued	that	the	tripartite	distinction	makes	full	sense	within	an	influential	current	account	of	modelling	practice.				 		REFERENCES		Bogen,	Jim	and	Woodward,	James.	1988.	Saving	the	Phenomena.	The	Philosophical	
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